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PAEDEIA: NSU Journal of Humanities, Social Sciences, and Law, Vol 1, 2025
DOI: https://doi.org/10.47126/nsushssjournal.v1i1.03
Timo Schmitz
ABSTRACT
The mind–body problem extends beyond a purely metaphysical dispute between idealism and
materialism. In contemporary contexts, debates concerning the origin of mind and life have
become increasingly politicized, often serving as focal points of broader cultural conflicts. As
a result, the philosophical question of whether intellect or matter is ontologically primary is
frequently obscured by ideological commitments. This paper examines the mind–body problem
from a Marxist perspective and argues that historical materialism, when treated as an exhaustive
and universal explanatory framework, assumes a dogmatic rather than evidential status. This
critique, however, does not diminish the analytical strength of Marxism in explaining socio-
economic and historical processes. Rather, it seeks to clarify the limits of its applicability. In
addition, the paper assesses the epistemic scope of Darwinian evolutionary theory, arguing that
while it constitutes a robust scientific framework—particularly at the microevolutionary
level—it remains limited with respect to questions concerning the origin of life and mind. These
limitations justify the continued philosophical legitimacy of non-Darwinian and non-materialist
paradigms as complementary or critical alternatives within specific domains of inquiry.
Keywords: Mind, Body, Descartes, Christianity, Evolution, Historical Materialism
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The Mind-Body Problem in Times
of Ideological Radicalization
An Eternal Struggle: Idealism vs. Materialism
Within Marxist traditions, historical materialism is often treated as a non-negotiable
explanatory framework. Although it is possible to endorse socialist political commitments
without adhering strictly to materialism, idealist positions are generally regarded as
incompatible with Marxist theory and, within orthodox Marxism, as decisively refuted (Schmitz
2024a, 14–17). Yet, as Schmitz aptly observes, the very notion of orthodoxy warrants critical
scrutiny: the term ὀρθοδοξία, derived from ὀρθός (“correct” or “righteous”) and δόξα
(“opinion” or “belief”), implicitly presupposes the existence of a “right” belief or faith—an
assumption that is itself philosophically contestable (Schmitz 2024a, 17). This observation
opens conceptual space for idealist positions to recognize and critique bourgeois injustice and
social corruption without necessarily adopting a materialist ontology. It also raises a more
fundamental question: can a doctrine or philosophy claim validity without a secure foundational
justification?
First, the debate between Materialism and Idealism is as old as philosophy itself. While
Materialists often criticize Idealists for focusing on an invisible metaphysics that lies beyond
empirical verification, Idealists argue that Materialists reduce human beings to their bodies,
their labor, their instincts, and their material needs—failing to account for the complexity of
the human mind. This tension is vividly illustrated in the rivalry between Neodarwinism and
Intelligent Design (ID). Neodarwinists attribute the origin of life to chance and material
processes, while proponents of ID emphasize intelligence, order, and purpose, giving primacy
to the mind.
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Both perspectives can be misappropriated: the former by atheist fundamentalists
seeking to eliminate spirituality, and the latter by religious fundamentalists aiming to transform
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Though Intelligent Design is rejected by a vast majority of scientists, there are scientists who try to demonstrate
ID with scientific methodology: “William Dembski and other proponents of the intelligent design movement are
attempting to demonstrate with scientific rigor that certain complex features of living cells and lower organisms
cannot be adequately explained by evolutionary biology. Their work appeals to many scientists who are religiously
inclined, especially within the context of a belief in a transcendent God. Many mainstream scientists, however,
hold that although biological organisms may have the appearance of a design in their evolution and function, they
can be fully explained in terms of current principles of physics, chemistry, and biology” (Behe, 2007, 95). Yet,
branding Intelligent Design as pseudoscience instead of properly dealing with their theories or trying to degrade
scientists with these views is not helpful, but rather the result of a politization and cultural wars in some societies.
Philosophically spoken, both are just different paradigms of seeing the world (idealism vs. materialism), based on
the evidence found by science. The question, which one is more likely does not play a role in this paper, but this
is rather something which natural scientists have to answer and which is beyond my competence.
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belief into fact. Yet the central philosophical question remains: is there purpose in life? If so,
what is its source? Purpose, order, and systematization imply a guiding intelligence capable of
shaping chaos. For Marxists, this poses a challenge. While Materialism effectively diagnoses
socio-political problems and motivates action, it is not an unassailable foundational proof
(Letztbegründung) and remains contestable. Marxist Materialism represents a radical stance at
the opposite extreme from Historical Idealism, which, as Schmitz demonstrates with the
example of Hinduism, can serve to institutionalize social hierarchies: “an Idealism passed along
from generation to generation” (Schmitz 2024, 97).
Between these extremes lies a spectrum of ideas exploring the relationship between
body and mind. Examining this relationship is crucial: the body is commonly associated with
the physical, while the mind represents intellect. To explore alternatives to Materialist extremes,
it is first necessary to consider the range of Materialist thought, identifying its contributions and
its limits regarding the mind-body problem. These insights must then be contrasted with the
most immediate Idealist counterparts. (This discussion will not extend to more elaborate forms
of Idealism, as that would exceed the scope of this paper.) Next, attention must turn to the mind
itself, addressing common misconceptions and limitations. Finally, the resulting analysis will
be situated within a Marxist framework.
Different Standpoints of Materialism
Historically, two primary approaches have addressed the mind-body problem: monism
and dualism. Monism emphasizes oneness, while “Dualism is the claim that there are two,
essentially different kinds or types of objects or categories in the world” (Alison n.d., 1).
Regarding body and mind, René Descartes exemplifies dualism: minds “are intangible, un-
extended, and metaphysically prior to bodies,” whereas bodies “are tangible physical objects in
the external world, have extension, and in some sense are seen to be reliant on minds for their
existence” (ibid.). Aside from the interaction between mind and body, every entity falls into
one of these two categories (ibid.).
Monism, in contrast, has two main forms: Idealism and Materialism. Materialism, which
“has enjoyed a massive surge in popularity” (Agius 2015, 98), includes several variants: (1)
behaviorism, which regards the mind as the totality of behavioral dispositions, with logical
behaviorism attempting to formalize these patterns (Agius 2015, 98–99); (2) identity theory,
subdivided into type-type and token-token identity theories, which reduce the mind to the brain
and, by extension, the body (Agius 2015, 100–101); and (3) functionalism, an enhanced form
of token-token theory, which interprets the mind mechanistically as input-output patterns within
the organism (Agius 2015, 101). These materialist theories prioritize matter over mind, making
consciousness dependent on physical substrates. In contrast, Idealism asks whether mind can
exist independently of matter, transcending bodily constraints.
Lyotard provides a critical perspective on this issue, stating: “Once we were considered
able to converse with Nature. Matter asks no questions, expects no answers of us. It made us
the way it made all bodies—by chance and according to its laws” (1988/89, 77). This
perspective has profound implications, suggesting that technology is not uniquely human: “Any
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material system is technological if it edits information useful to its survival […]” (ibid.). Human
beings, in this sense, are not fundamentally different from other living beings in their absorption
of data: “The body might be considered the hardware of the complex technical device that is
human thought” (Lyotard 1988/89, 78).
This raises the question of the “software” of thought. For Lyotard, human language
functions as this software, expressing thought; however, “this software, human language, is
dependent on the condition of the hardware” (Lyotard 1988/89, 79). If humanity and the Earth
were to disappear, thought could no longer be physically expressed, yet does thought itself
vanish? Lyotard’s reflections provide two key insights: first, “Perceptual ‘recognition’ never
satisfies the logical demand for complete description” (1988/89, 82), and second, “Thinking
and suffering overlap. […] The body and the mind have to be free of burdens for grace to touch
us. That doesn’t happen without suffering” (1988/89, 82–83). Thought, therefore, requires
emptiness in order to exist authentically. This insight resonates with the Buddhist concept of
shunyata, or emptiness, which is not mere absence but the condition through which meaning
and perception arise. Lyotard suggests that thinking already engages symbolism—expressed
through language and constrained by patterns and rules—but this is distinct from “eternal
thinking”: “This kind of thinking has little to do with combining symbols in accordance with a
set of rules” (Lyotard 1988/89, 84).
I must admit that my understanding of Lyotard may be imperfect. As a reader, I can only
interpret his symbols and arguments through my own mental framework, which may distort his
intended meaning. We each process thought individually; even if the mind exists independently
of the body, we cannot directly access another’s consciousness. Misunderstanding is inevitable,
particularly in complex subjects. In everyday life, such misunderstandings occur routinely,
though we often remain unaware of them. Complexity and novelty demand caution and careful
reflection, whereas routine situations encourage overconfidence.
But this is not the only problem. Another fundamental limitation is that humans are
never complete: complete in the sense of embodying “everyone.” Individual distinctions
inevitably produce innate imperfections, which Francis Bacon termed “idols.” Some of these
idols are generic, inherent to all humans, while others are more individual, shaped by education
or experience. Lyotard highlights one particular dimension of incompleteness in relation to
gender: “It’s an accepted proposition that sexual difference is a paradigm of an incompleteness
of not just bodies, but minds too” (1988/89, 85). While it is unclear how Lyotard establishes
this as a universally accepted proposition, the notion reflects a widespread cultural dualism. In
Chinese philosophy, for instance, this dualism appears as yin and yang, representing
complementary female and male energies. In Judaism, it is expressed through zahur and
shamur, with zahur signifying male and remembrance, and shamur female and observation
(Franklin 2016). Franklin provides an extensive overview of the religious context, though a
detailed discussion exceeds the scope of this analysis. It suffices here to note that metaphysical
interpretations of sexual difference recur across diverse civilizations.
In Chinese thought, yin and yang encompass not only female and male but also cosmic
and elemental attributes, such as moon and sun or cold and warmth, reflecting an oppositional
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dualism. Lyotard extends this insight to the unconscious, arguing that “Sexual difference isn’t
just related to a body as it feels its incompleteness, but to an unconscious body or to the
unconscious as body. That is, as separated from thought—even analogical thought” (1988/89,
85). This resonates with the Biblical view, where completeness is found only in God. Genesis
1:27 asserts that God created human beings in His likeness, “male and female,” implying that
God embodies both aspects, not one alone. In contemporary discourse, some societies have
recognized a third gender, but traditionally, gender has been understood in dualistic terms rather
than a μεταξύ.
The Bible emphasizes complementary relationships and the importance of
companionship rather than establishing patriarchy. Certain passages even challenge established
gender norms, highlighting that men cannot live alone, that males are not inherently superior,
and presenting women as heroes within societies traditionally regarded as male-dominated. In
this sense, the biblical perspective can be seen as surprisingly progressive. Marxists, however,
may question its authority, arguing that the Bible is not grounded in empirical evidence but in
narrative. Idealists, in contrast, rightly insist that the Bible should be interpreted as μῦθος, as a
meaningful narrative rather than a scientific account. Reliance on historical materialism without
critical reflection risks turning Marx into a quasi-messianic figure: his vision becomes a secular
“Biblical Kingdom,” where righteousness prevails and his followers uncritically accept his
authority.
Lyotard’s analysis emphasizes the fundamental incompleteness of human
understanding. Individuals are limited by their gender—or, in modern terms, by their gender
identity—and no human can embody all perspectives. Moreover, the content of thought,
language, and discourses further constrain the mind, expressing human suffering since the
eternal mind cannot be fully captured by language. Perceptual recognition alone is insufficient
for complete understanding. As Lindsay notes, “for Lyotard all discourse is rhetorical.
Language cannot really represent the libidinal body because that body never was and will never
be present as an object to be represented. The libidinal body is hypothesized and imagined only
retrospectively from the ‘live body’ we inhabit and encounter in society” (1991, 35). This does
not mean that Lyotard dismisses the body as an illusion; rather, it cannot be empirically
apprehended in its entirety (ibid.). The theme of incompleteness is not merely modern: it is
evident across ancient civilizations and continues to influence contemporary thought, including
biblical traditions. Both the Bible and Marx’s writings illustrate a critical point: they should not
be read literally or divorced from historical and cultural contexts. Although they belong to
different genres and serve different purposes, Lyotard’s framework demonstrates why purely
materialist accounts remain unsatisfying—they are restricted to the body and fail to capture the
mind’s broader, irreducible dimensions.
Furthermore, materialism exhibits a significant weakness that calls all of its variants—
including Marxist materialism—into question. As Agius observes, “materialist accounts are
brilliant at explaining how the ‘the mind’ [sic] works in a quantitative and objective sense.
However, they cannot account for the qualitative and subjective aspect of the mind” (2015,
102). Materialism thus fails to account for qualia, which are essential for any holistic
understanding of mental phenomena. Yet this difficulty is not confined to materialist
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frameworks; traditional Idealism encounters related problems. Plato, for instance, draws a strict
distinction between the world of perception and the world of knowledge: the former is
associated with becoming, the latter with being. Being, in this framework, transcends sense
perception, whereas the very notion of qualia presupposes perceptual experience.
Consequently, a purely Platonic account struggles to accommodate subjective experience as it
is lived.
At this point, it is necessary to step back from modern interpretations of ancient
philosophy and turn instead to Descartes’ method of radical doubt. René Descartes “begins by
eliminating the reliability of all sense perception” (Alison n.d., 1), thereby aligning himself with
Plato’s skepticism regarding perception as a source of truth. True knowledge, on this view,
must concern intelligibles—entities that remain invariant. Mathematics provides a paradigmatic
example, since propositions such as 2 + 2 = 4 appear universally and necessarily true,
independent of sensory input. However, Descartes extends his doubt even here, questioning
whether such logical truths might themselves be the product of deception (cf. Alison n.d., 2).
Nevertheless, he concludes that the very act of doubting presupposes a thinking subject: even
if he is deceived, there must be something that thinks. Accordingly, “Descartes can only hold
that he exists insofar as he is a thinking thing” (ibid.).
From this follows the conclusion that mind does not require attachment to a body in
order to exist. While Descartes cannot be certain that his body exists, he can be certain that a
thinking mind exists; thus, “his mind is not the same as his body” (ibid.). Such dualistic
reasoning has played a significant role within the Abrahamic religious traditions, which
commonly conceive the human being as composed of body and soul. As Agius clarifies, within
a Cartesian framework, “the best way to understand the notion of the different essences would
be to think of the mind as equivalent to the soul” (2015, 97). In contrast, materialist or
physicalist approaches regard human beings as “strictly material or strictly physical substances”
(Wong 2020, 2), whereas dualist positions maintain that the human person consists of an
immaterial soul and a material body (Wong 2020, 2f.). Because the soul exists prior to and
independently of the body, this position aligns with Idealism. Indeed, “if we believe in an
immaterial, incorporeal God (e.g., John 4:24), then it just seems obvious that all of reality
cannot be exclusively physical” (Wong 2020, 3). Nevertheless, Wong also acknowledges the
possibility of theistic physicalism. The rationale is that even if human beings are strictly
physical in composition, this does not necessarily exclude the existence of immaterial
dimensions of reality (Wong 2020, 3). Within this framework, “someone is not made up of a
body and soul, but rather exists in bodily and soulish manners” (Wong 2020, 6). In contrast to
Idealist paradigms, body and soul are not assigned distinct ontological substances but are
understood as different modes of existence.
It is also important to recognize that the Bible emerged from a Semitic cultural context.
Although the New Testament was written in Greek, Greek functioned primarily as a universal
lingua franca—analogous to the role of English or French today—rather than as an indicator of
philosophical orientation. As James D. G. Dunn notes, “while Greek thought tended to regard
the human being as made up of distinct parts, Hebrew thought saw the human being more as a
whole person existing on different dimensions” (cited in Wong 2020, 6). Similarly, Daniel
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Heinz distinguishes between two classical worldviews: the Greek-philosophical and the
Hebrew-prophetical (2022, 5). The biblical texts are clearly situated within the latter tradition.
However, as noted elsewhere, neither the Bible nor the patristic tradition developed in isolation
from Greek philosophical influences. The philosophical and prophetic trajectories intersect
rather than remain wholly independent. Even within Greek philosophy, divine intervention
plays a role—for instance, the Delphic oracle that motivates Socrates’ philosophical vocation,
as described in Plato’s Apology (cf. Schefer 1996).
Some scholars nevertheless claim “that dualism is a Greek import into, or corruption of,
Christianity” (Wong 2020, 6). While it is accurate to describe dualism as an import—not only
into Christianity but also into certain strands of Old Testament and Jewish thought—it should
not be characterized as a corruption. Rather, it reflects a broader paradigm shift within a
civilization. Just as the emergence of workers’ movements transformed the self-understanding
of the working classes by introducing class consciousness, the introduction of Hellenic thought
reshaped earlier worldviews. Such transformations are not corruptions but historical
developments. Cultural and philosophical exchange is a constant feature of history. Indeed,
Persian and Egyptian ideas influenced early Greek thought; Homer’s worldview differs
markedly from that of Thales, and the Milesian school emerged within a multicultural Ionian
context. Intercultural exchange, therefore, is not an anomaly but a constitutive element of
intellectual history.
It is therefore plausible that in the earlier strata of the Old Testament, life was not
conceived in terms of a strict body–soul dualism. Wong illustrates this by examining the
Hebrew term nefesh, which is commonly translated as “soul” but “also refers to the throat (Ps
105:18; Jonah 2:5[6]), blood (Gen 9:4; possibly 35:18), and even corpses (e.g. Lev 19:28; Num
6:6), suggesting that the human person’s essential being is inseparable from that one’s
physicality” (Wong 2020, 7). In Genesis 2:7, the human becomes a nefesh ḥayyāh, meaning a
“living creature,” prompting Wong to observe: “No mention of a soul here” (ibid.). At the same
time, life is described as being breathed into the human’s nostrils by God; prior to this divine
act, Adam’s body existed but lacked life and vitality. This indicates a distinction between
corporeality and vivacity, even if not yet articulated in terms of a fully developed soul concept.
Across cultures, the soul is frequently imagined as a life-giving force rather than as a
discrete metaphysical substance. This idea is not unique to Greek philosophy but appears in
religious and philosophical traditions worldwide. In Chinese thought, for example, qi (气)
denotes a vital force that animates all living beings; life, on this view, is characterized by the
presence of force within matter, whereas matter alone is inert. Similarly, the Belgian missionary
Placide Tempels observed among the Bantu peoples of the Congo that “force constitutes being,”
such that the degree of vitality corresponds to the amount of force a being possesses (Tempels
1959). These perspectives naturally incline toward Idealist interpretations, in which a
primordial force gives form and vitality to reality. Unlike the biblical tradition, however, such
frameworks do not necessarily posit a personal God as their foundation; instead, they may
appeal to impersonal dynamics as the source of being. An example of this approach can be
found in Leo Koguan’s pantheistic synthesis of quantum physics, computer science, and
Chinese philosophy (cf. Leo 2014; 2015).
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Wong (2020, 9) extends the discussion by arguing that the doctrine of resurrection is
more coherent if human beings are understood as primarily bodily. If resurrection entails the
renewal of the body, its significance becomes clearer, whereas a soul conceived as eternally
self-identical would seemingly have no need of resurrection, as it would simply return to its
proper place. While many Christian traditions envision a continuous transition from life to death
through the soul—such that existence is not interrupted—Adventist and Millennial streams tend
to affirm not only bodily death but death as a total condition, with life being restored only at
Christ’s return. In this framework, death is often compared to a sleep-like state. This
interpretation is frequently supported by Ecclesiastes 9:5, which states that the dead “know
nothing.” However, as Centeno (2011) demonstrates, this passage is often taken out of context;
it does not claim that the dead cease to exist, but rather that they no longer participate in earthly
life. Death, in this sense, signifies separation rather than annihilation or non-being (ibid.). From
a philosophical perspective, physicalism maintains that it “has no need for elaborate theories of
how the person relates to her body; she simply is her body” (Wong 2020, 13). This position
seeks to avoid metaphysical dualism altogether, yet it raises further questions regarding vitality,
consciousness, and personal identity that remain unresolved within a purely material
framework.
Interestingly, Wong explicitly positions himself in opposition to naturalism and
physicalism. Arguing from a biblical perspective, he suggests that dualists may “point out the
common conflation between holism and monism as well as the overturning of the so-called
Hellenization thesis” (Wong 2020, 15). While it is difficult to deny that Hellenistic concepts
influenced biblical interpretation, it remains legitimate to question whether pre-Hellenic
perspectives were fundamentally different in this regard. Notably, the idea that being is
fundamentally spiritual originates not primarily in Greek thought but rather in Near Eastern,
Persian, and Egyptian traditions. In Homeric literature, for example, the soul was still conceived
in largely corporeal terms, whereas Orphic and Pythagorean traditions—likely imported into
Greece—emphasized a more mystical anthropology (Hirschberger 1976, 14–17). Similarly, the
pre-Socratic natural philosophers cannot be characterized as physicalists in any strict sense;
Thales, for instance, famously maintained that the world is “full of spirits” (cf. Schmitz 2022).
Against this background, Wong is justified in asserting that “dualism simply is not a corruption
of Judeo-Christian anthropology” (2020, 15).
From a theological standpoint, Wong emphasizes the value of embodiment, stating, “My
body is important to me even if I am not my body […]” (Wong 2020, 15). Accordingly, biblical
references to the body should not be interpreted negatively within Christian theology, as
creation is affirmed as fundamentally good; the body, therefore, cannot be reduced to sinful
flesh alone. This affirmation of bodily value, however, does not preclude the existence of a soul
distinct from the body. Philosophically, neither physicalism nor dualism has been conclusively
demonstrated, and the natural sciences have so far failed to provide a fully satisfactory
explanation for either position. This is evident, for example, in speculative proposals such as
“the fascinating proposal that quantum entanglement implies that so-called spooky action at a
distance requires an immaterial mind” (Wong 2020, 16). Consequently, Wong concludes,
“Ultimately, I think Christian physicalism is wrong. But I do not think that it is obviously
wrong. That is to say, Christian physicalism may be wrong, but it is not crazy” (2020, 17).
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It follows that materialism itself encompasses a variety of forms, including Historical
Materialism, Behaviorism, Empiricism, Type–Type Identity Theory, Token–Token Identity
Theory, Functionalism, and Christian physicalism. Despite their internal differences, all of
these approaches ultimately reduce reality to matter as their primary explanatory principle. As
demonstrated through Lyotard’s discourse, an empiricist approach remains insufficient insofar
as it fails to account for full recognition and meaning. Conversely, Wong’s proposal shows that
by modifying ontological assumptions, it may be possible to overcome mind–body dualism by
reconceiving the soul not as an independent entity. Such a framework could even offer an
intriguing account of resurrection. Nevertheless, Wong himself remains unconvinced by this
materialist solution, and, moreover, materialist or physicalist interpretations of resurrection
appear to lack robust biblical grounding.The difficulty with Idealism, by contrast, is that
although it transcends the limitations of empiricism, it necessarily entails metaphysical
commitments and therefore cannot be conclusively demonstrated to a skeptic who accepts only
what is empirically observable. For this reason, a more precise analysis of what the mind is—
and how it is conceptually framed—is required in order to clarify the underlying dilemma.
So, what about Mind?
David Berlinski has addressed the question of the origin and nature of mind by
identifying three dominant similes operative within evolutionary psychology (2004, 26). The
first proposes that the human mind functions analogously to a computer; the second suggests
that the individual human mind is comparable to organs such as the kidney, insofar as it is newly
generated within each organism; the third maintains that a universal human mind—understood
as the material expression of human nature—arose through random variation and natural
selection, like other complex biological structures (ibid.). From the outset, it is evident that none
of these approaches offers a direct account of what mind is; rather, they rely on analogical
reasoning. Berlinski is therefore justified in characterizing these accounts as similes rather than
explanations. The critical question is thus not whether these similes are evocative, but to what
extent they illuminate the nature of mind and where their explanatory limits become apparent.
With regard to the first simile, Alan Turing’s conceptualization of an abstract machine
in 1936 aimed at modeling a smooth imitation of human cognition (Berlinski 2004, 28). Yet a
Turing machine is fundamentally constrained in its operations, acquiring its imitative capacities
only through externally supplied programs or algorithms (Berlinski 2004, 29). Contemporary
developments in artificial intelligence have not altered this basic limitation. No convincing case
has been made that AI systems possess understanding, awareness, or subjective experience.
Computational performance, even at advanced levels, remains qualitatively distinct from
human cognition. The term “artificial intelligence” is therefore misleading insofar as it
attributes intelligence to systems that merely execute programmed operations. Unlike human
minds, machines are not self-determining; they do not act for themselves or upon themselves
in a reflexive manner.
In this respect, Morozov is correct in emphasizing that generative AI large language
models, such as ChatGPT, “draw their strength from the work of real humans: artists, musicians,
programmers and writers whose creative and professional output is now appropriated in the
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name of saving civilisation. At best, this is ‘non-artificial intelligence’” (2023).He further traces
prevailing conceptions of machine intelligence to Cold War paradigms, in which pattern
recognition was valorized for strategic purposes (ibid.). While AI systems excel at pattern
matching, this capacity bears little resemblance to human intelligence understood as self-aware,
interpretive, and normatively oriented cognition. Even when machines perform tasks
resembling human activity, these performances remain algorithmic simulations rather than
manifestations of genuine understanding or knowledge. Berlinski reinforces this point by
invoking Albertus Magnus and Isaac Newton, arguing that “a machine is a material object, a
thing, and as such, its capacity to do work is determined by the forces governing its behavior
and by its initial conditions” (2004, 29). His critique of the first simile is therefore both
philosophically and empirically compelling, especially in light of contemporary research
highlighting the immense complexity of the human brain.
At this point, the argument may be extended further. If a machine can act only in
accordance with what it has been instructed to do, and if the brain itself were merely a machine,
then this would necessarily imply the existence of an intelligent source responsible for its
design. Such reasoning would point toward a Creator and thus constitute an argument for the
primacy of intellect over matter—provided that this Creator is not reducible to material
substance. Consequently, the mind cannot be fully explained within a strictly physicalist.
Although artificial intelligence in general, and large language models (LLMs) in particular, are
currently promoted as having the potential to approximate or even surpass human intelligence,
the reality is considerably more limited. As Alang explains, “units of meaning, such as words,
parts of words and characters, become tokens and are assigned numerical values. The models
learn how tokens relate to other tokens and, over time, learn something like context: where a
word might appear, in what order, and so on” (2024). This description indicates that such
systems lack cognition in any substantive sense. Whereas human beings perceive information
through sensory organs and at least believe themselves to have recognized something—
remaining within Lyotard’s conceptual framework—AI does not recognize anything at all. Its
operations are purely algorithmic, and the patterns it “identifies” bear no meaningful
resemblance to human recognition.
Similarly, what is often described as AI “knowledge” is entirely dependent on human
input. For this reason, AI systems are particularly prone to bias, whereas human beings possess
the capacity to reflect upon information and correct bias once it is recognized. More radically
stated, AI merely orders and systematizes information provided by humans. Although it may
establish connections between data more rapidly than humans, it does not recognize or think
for itself, which constitutes a fundamental limitation. AI is not even aware of its own
“discourses,” despite functioning as a conversational “partner.” This absence of discursive self-
awareness entails a lack of human-like understanding and precludes the capacity to reason
beyond its programming.
By contrast, the human mind exhibits a metaphysical dimension characterized by self-
awareness and autonomy. Human beings are capable of refusing to perform actions on ethical
grounds, whereas AI lacks an intrinsic moral compass. Even if moral understanding is assumed
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to be culturally conditioned, a human being comprehends the meaning of a command such as
“Thou shalt not kill” and is able to internalize it as a moral prohibition. AI, by contrast, can
reproduce such a statement as output without any awareness of its meaning or conviction
regarding moral right and wrong. Consequently, AI is neither epistemologically intelligent—
since it lacks self-recognition and self-awareness—nor ontologically intelligent, as it does not
generate action from itself but merely executes instructions. This absence of volition may
explain why AI is sometimes characterized as a “people-pleaser.”
From a Cartesian perspective, AI consists solely of material substance and is therefore
incapable of mindful reasoning, functioning instead through mechanical processing; in this
sense, it does not possess a mind. Alternatively, following Wong—despite his rejection of
Christian physicalism—intelligence presupposes “soulish” capacities that enable ethical
orientation and moral responsibility, capacities that AI lacks. Human beings can be touched by
grace; AI cannot. AI has no concern for whether Jesus Christ is the savior, whereas human
beings are capable of wholehearted religious commitment and conviction, including the belief
that justification occurs through divine grace. If AI lacks any understanding of sin, it cannot
experience a need for justification. Knowledge, therefore, cannot be reduced to data storage
alone. As already suggested in biblical contexts, knowledge is understood as something holistic
and intimate (cf. Vogel 2010).
This insight resonates with other philosophical and cultural traditions. If one follows Descartes
in maintaining a strict distinction between mind and body, the spirit nevertheless expresses
itself through the body. Similarly, in traditional Chinese thought, mind is located in the heart,
reflected linguistically in the term xin (心), which denotes both heart and mind. In this
worldview, reason is not detached from affectivity but expressed through it. These perspectives
further undermine the simile that equates the human brain with a computer and, by extension,
challenge materialist attempts to mechanize mind.
The second simile identified by Berlinski also fails to provide a satisfactory explanation.
As he observes, “where biochemical and quantum chemical accounts of development are
similarly clear and compelling, they extend no farther than a few large molecules. They defer
what they cannot explain” (Berlinski 2004, 32). Other explanatory approaches, according to
Berlinski, often presuppose what they aim to explain, leaving a remainder unaccounted for
(ibid.). His examples are convincing, and the argument itself is sound. Biological and chemical
processes are frequently described through metaphors, yet such metaphors do not genuinely
explain underlying mechanisms; rather, they function as heuristic models for organizing
observations.In examples such as those provided by Berlinski (2004, 32), expressions like
“produce voluntary responses” implicitly attribute volition to biological patterns, while genes
are said to “influence” or “create” as though they possessed agency. Such descriptions
anthropomorphize biological processes and obscure unresolved explanatory gaps. While these
accounts offer valuable insights into bodily mechanisms, they ultimately circumvent rather than
resolve the fundamental questions at stake. It is conceivable that a comprehensive
understanding of these complexities may one day allow us to explain the brain and, by
extension, the mind. At present, however, we remain far from such an achievement.
12
When addressing the third argument, the discussion enters a particularly contested
terrain. Scholarly perspectives on Darwinism are deeply divided, and opposing camps
frequently attempt to discredit one another rather than engage in substantive debate. Many Neo-
Darwinists go so far as to dismiss non-Darwinian theories as pseudoscientific without seriously
examining their arguments. In this way, the strengths and weaknesses of Intelligent Design (ID)
are often not assessed at all, as the position is rejected a priori. Such radical stances overlook
the fact that proponents of Intelligent Design and Darwinism largely agree on at least one
fundamental point: the empirical reality of microevolution. This agreement, however, is
frequently obscured in public and academic discourse.
It is therefore instructive to recall that the term evolution itself has long been subject to
semantic ambiguity. As early as 1975, Bowler analyzed the historical development of the
concept, showing that it originally referred to the embryological development of an individual
organism and only later acquired its broader meaning as a theory of the origin and
transformation of life (Bowler 1975, 95). As Bowler notes, “Yet it is not generally realized that
in both of these senses, the word meant different things to different people. It has been used to
describe embryological development by workers who held fundamentally different views as to
the nature of that process, and similar complications may be recognized in the later use of the
term to describe transmutation” (ibid.). This historical analysis demonstrates that evolution has
never had a single, unambiguous meaning, a problem that persists today.
Currently, three distinct meanings of evolution are commonly distinguished: (1) change
over time, (2) common ancestry, and (3) natural selection acting through random mutation
(West & Luskin 2018, 4). In the first sense, evolution denotes the observable fact that
contemporary life forms differ from those that existed in the distant past. It may also refer to
relatively minor changes within species occurring over short periods of time. As West and
Luskin emphasize, even critics of Darwin’s theory acknowledge that such changes occur (ibid.).
This phenomenon is well documented at the microevolutionary level, and no serious scientist—
whether working within a Darwinian or non-Darwinian framework—denies its existence. The
second definition refers to the idea that all present-day organisms descend from a common
ancestor. While this claim is debated, disagreements typically concern specific mechanisms or
historical pathways rather than the general concept itself.
The primary point of contention lies in the third definition, which understands evolution
as a wholly undirected process of natural selection and random mutation capable of explaining
the origin and complexity of life. This perspective is commonly referred to as macroevolution,
as it attempts to account for large-scale biological developments by extrapolating from
microevolutionary processes. As Meyer explains, Neo-Darwinists argue that such extrapolation
provides a “designer substitute” capable of explaining the appearance of design in biology
without invoking intentionality (Meyer 2006). On this view, the emergence of complex life—
including human beings capable of ethical reasoning, technological innovation, and cultural
achievement—is ultimately the result of chance. This interpretation is strictly materialist and
bottom-up, presupposing that increasingly complex forms of life arise without direction or
purpose.
13
Intelligent Design represents the opposing position. As an idealist approach, it presumes
that intellect precedes matter. According to the Discovery Institute, Intelligent Design “is a
scientific theory that holds that the emergence of some features of the universe and living things
is best explained by an intelligent cause rather than an undirected process such as natural
selection” (Luskin 2015). Meyer further clarifies that ID does not challenge evolution
understood as change over time or common ancestry, but rather disputes the claim that
biological change is entirely blind and undirected (Meyer 2006). Even critics of ID
acknowledge this distinction. Neill, for example, notes that unlike creationists, ID proponents
accept many core conclusions of modern science, including the age of the universe, geological
timescales, and the role of mutation and natural selection in shaping aspects of the natural world
(Neill 2005).
The question then arises as to why ID proponents accept “many of the conclusions of
science.” One reason is that ID can be understood as a scientific paradigm whose researchers
accept empirical evidence but offer alternative interpretations where Darwinism remains
inconclusive—particularly with respect to macroevolution. If Intelligent Design rejected
established scientific findings, it would not qualify as a scientific discipline. The tendency to
dismiss ID as unscientific often stems from a methodological commitment to naturalism,
according to which all phenomena must be explained exclusively through physical causes.
From this perspective, any non-materialist explanation is disqualified by definition. As a result,
some natural scientists assume that their discipline can provide a complete account of life and
its origins by extrapolating observed data to broader, speculative frameworks.
This methodological absolutism parallels the stance of religious fundamentalism, which
rejects scientific evidence when it conflicts with scriptural interpretation. In both cases,
explanatory claims extend beyond what can be empirically demonstrated. Natural scientists are
tasked with describing observed phenomena, yet at times they move beyond interpretation into
speculative reconstruction of the entire cosmos by interpolating from micro-level evidence to
macro-level conclusions. Such extrapolations, however, remain assumptions rather than
established facts. As Kreiml, drawing on the work of Harald Schöndorf, observes, “the claim
that natural science has proven that evolution as a whole is due to pure chance and has no
purpose whatsoever is false. Darwin's theory of evolution cannot do without purposiveness”
(2022; translation from German mine). Nonetheless, public discourse often reduces evolution
to randomness alone, as though mutation constituted the entirety of evolutionary explanation.
This reduction contributes to the widespread perception that evolution is synonymous with the
third definition alone, leading to the dismissal of Intelligent Design on the mistaken assumption
that its proponents reject evolution entirely. In summary, there is broad scientific consensus
regarding evolutionary change over time. Observable modifications within populations across
generations—such as viral mutation in response to treatments or adaptive changes in animals
to shifting climates—are well established and uncontroversial. These processes are naturalistic
and empirically verified. The fundamental point of divergence between paradigms concerns the
origin of life itself. Put differently, the unresolved question is whether the world—and human
existence within it—is ultimately the product of chance, or whether it presupposes an
originating intellect.
14
Some churches, as well as certain researchers, attempt to address this tension by
proposing that God exists alongside evolution. This position poses little difficulty with respect
to microevolution, since one may argue that God is the ultimate source of life while biological
systems sustain and transform themselves through adaptive processes. However, this approach
becomes untenable when applied to macroevolution. A conception of God who initiates an
evolutionary process governed entirely by randomness raises the question of what kind of deity
this would be—arguably one that is nearly powerless. This leads to the central problem: which
account is correct? Is there an originating intellect—whether conceived as God or as some
impersonal force—or is there nothing intelligent at the beginning at all?
Some seek to avoid this conflict by insisting on a strict separation between science and
religion, maintaining that one may believe in God in a religious context while simultaneously
endorsing Darwinism, according to which all biological development is subject to natural
selection and random mutation. Yet fully embracing Darwinism in this sense while affirming
belief in God entails a deep conceptual tension. One cannot consistently believe in both a creator
and non-creation, since the absence of creation negates the very notion of a creator. In such a
case, God would be anything but a creator, insofar as He does not create. This contradiction
often goes unnoticed in everyday discourse, where the incompatibility of the two paradigms is
obscured. Idealism and materialism are mutually exclusive at the level of first principles: the
former assigns primacy to intellect, while the latter assigns primacy to matter.
At the same time, neither paradigm has yet established itself as ultimate truth.
Evolutionary theory—understood not in the colloquial sense of “theory” but as a scientifically
grounded framework—is well supported at the lower levels. Anyone who denies the validity of
microevolutionary processes by insisting on a literalist scriptural account is not arguing
scientifically. Nevertheless, the question of origins remains unresolved, which is why idealist
schools of thought have not been rendered obsolete and remain philosophically viable. Theism
typically rests on an idealist foundation, although physicalist variants are conceivable, as Wong
has shown. This raises the further question of whether God himself could be physically
constituted: is God material, and did He become divine by chance? Such questions illustrate the
conceptual challenges faced by physicalist theologies. There are also clear motivational
interests on both sides of the debate. Religious institutions benefit from Intelligent Design,
insofar as it supports the plausibility of theism; if no divine intellect existed at the beginning,
the foundation of theistic religion would be undermined. Conversely, staunch atheists have an
interest in discrediting Intelligent Design as “pseudoscience,” often claiming that its proponents
merely seek to scientize the biblical creation narrative in order to resist Darwinism. As a result,
even limited empirical support for Darwinism is sometimes interpreted as a decisive
confirmation of Darwinism as a whole. This tendency is reinforced by the ambiguous use of the
term evolution, which often obscures whether microevolution or macroevolution is being
discussed. For example, Gregory writes: “It has been noted many times that evolution is both a
fact and a theory (Gould 1981; Moran 1993; Futuyma 1998; Lenski 2000). It can also be
considered in terms of a historical path (Ruse 1997). The fact of evolution, that organisms alive
today is related by descent from common ancestors, is fundamental to an understanding of
biology. As Dobzhansky (1973) famously stated, ‘nothing in biology makes sense except in the
light of evolution’” (2007). In this context, evolution is treated as a fact primarily in terms of
15
microevolution, a position no serious scientist dispute. To Gregory’s credit, he immediately
adds: “Nevertheless, a great deal remains to be determined regarding the mechanisms that have
created (and destroyed) biological diversity since the emergence of life on Earth. Put in another
way, modern evolutionary biology rests upon an extraordinarily solid foundation supported by
multiple pillars of evidence, while its theoretical framework remains under construction”
(ibid.). For readers unfamiliar with the multiple meanings of evolution, however, claims such
as “evolution is a fact” may be misleading.
My interpretation of Gregory’s argument is that microevolution rests on a solid
empirical foundation and could lead to further confirmation at the macroevolutionary level. Yet
this also implies that such extrapolations could turn out to be incorrect. I acknowledge the
possibility that I may have misunderstood his position, since communication is mediated
through language and interpretation always involves the risk of misreading. What remains
indisputable is that no definitive resolution has yet been reached. This unresolved status is
precisely why the mind–body problem remains unsettled. If a materialist origin were
conclusively demonstrated, mind would necessarily depend on the body and be confined to
individual organisms. Yet the issue is not so straightforward.
One might argue that only what is visible should be accepted as real; however, gravity
provides a clear counterexample. Although gravity itself is invisible and lacks a concrete form,
its effects are observable and undeniable. The same may apply to other non-visible forces.
Analogously, the existence of God cannot be dismissed as inherently irrational, nor can
Christian physicalism be categorically rejected. Idealist theories may ultimately prove
incorrect, but there is no decisive evidence demonstrating that they are. Consequently, the
insistence on materialism by orthodox Marxists functions as a dogma in much the same way as
the belief in an immutable caste order functions within conservative Hindu traditions. Both
claim necessity on the basis of historical interpretation, yet arrive at divergent conclusions.
Interpreting evidence through different paradigms is therefore not only unavoidable but also
philosophically legitimate.
In this context, Darwinism and Intelligent Design have increasingly become entangled
in the broader radicalization of U.S. society, where a sustained cultural conflict between left-
leaning and conservative positions shapes public and academic discourse. As early as 2005,
Chris Mooney published The Republican War on Science, a work that may be read as a critique
of conservative political forces and their alleged undermining of scientific inquiry. Conversely,
David Horowitz’s The Professors: The 101 Most Dangerous Academics in America (2006)
identified a significant number of allegedly “dangerous” academics who are predominantly
associated with the political left. This dynamic reflects an ongoing pattern: conservative actors
often perceive universities as dominated by leftist ideologies, while left-leaning groups tend to
interpret conservative positions as threats to scientific autonomy and freedom. Without
engaging here in a detailed evaluation of the merits or shortcomings of either publication, this
simplified overview nonetheless illustrates the longevity and intensity of U.S. cultural conflicts
surrounding science and ideology.
16
Both political camps operate largely within self-reinforcing interpretive frameworks.
Since Intelligent Design tends to resonate more strongly with conservative audiences—
particularly those with theistic commitments—while Darwinian macroevolution, often
accompanied by implicit or explicit atheistic assumptions, is more appealing to left-leaning
groups traditionally critical of institutional religion, the question of whether materialism or
idealism holds explanatory priority has become highly instrumentalized. Each side frequently
characterizes the other as being driven by ideological or religious motives. This polarization
has not remained confined to the United States. In Europe, for example, the Council of Europe
Assembly Resolution 1580 (2007) against creationism also classifies Intelligent Design as non-
scientific. Such a determination constitutes a political judgment rather than a scientific one and
may therefore be interpreted as an intervention that potentially restricts academic freedom.
As Wald aptly observes, “Anyone who is once exposed to the accusation of
fundamentalism can hardly defend themselves in a media-driven world of communication.
Despite the obvious differences from creationism, the Intelligent Design Movement (ID) is
suspected of being just as anti-modern and anti-scientific. […] My thesis will be that the
accusation of fundamentalism is being used to cover up explanatory weaknesses [of Neo-
Darwinism] and to keep uncomfortable questions at a distance. ID theorists such as Michael
Behe and William Demski use not biblically supported beliefs, but solely findings from the
field of molecular biology to argue against the completeness claim of naturalistic explanations”
(2016; translation from German mine). It can therefore be concluded that a potentially
legitimate scientific paradigm is being contested at the political level, leading to increasingly
entrenched positions. This development is troubling, as scientific inquiry depends on open,
ideology-independent debate, grounded in mutual respect—even for perspectives deemed
controversial or inconvenient. Where ideological commitments or political interventions
dominate, academic freedom is inevitably placed at risk.
Mapping Historical Materialism to Understand the Fundamental Problem
Historical materialism constitutes the Marxist theory of history, according to which
material conditions form the foundational precondition of social life, while phenomena such as
culture, religion, and ideology emerge subsequently. On this view, the material conditions of
existence fundamentally shape human consciousness. The explanatory strength of historical
materialism lies in its capacity to account for historical conflict through economic relations.
Marx demonstrated with considerable analytical precision how economic interests structure
historical development, and how a wide range of social phenomena can be meaningfully
interpreted through a materialist framework. His analysis elucidates the mechanisms of
exploitation, the conditions under which it occurs, and the struggles undertaken to overcome
it—often resulting, however, in the reemergence of new class formations and persistent forms
of injustice.
Nevertheless, Marx does not provide a sufficient Letztbegründung for the origin of life
or existence as such. From the premise of the primacy of matter, he inferred that all phenomena,
including consciousness, must ultimately arise from material processes; mind is thus
understood as emergent from matter, rather than matter being the product of mind. In this
17
respect, Darwinian evolutionary theory holds particular appeal for Marxist thought, as it appears
to offer a complementary explanatory framework—albeit within a distinct domain. If life itself
is the result of natural selection and random mutation, then consciousness may likewise be
understood as an evolutionary product. Under a fully established Darwinian account, belief in
a transcendent creator would appear irrational. However, evolutionary theory has not
conclusively demonstrated its explanatory sufficiency at the macroevolutionary level, leaving
open the possibility of alternative interpretations. This unresolved tension presents a challenge
for Marxist theory. If historical materialism is rejected or relativized, its claim to explain history
as a coherent totality is weakened. Yet this limitation points to an important distinction: while
Marxism offers a powerful account of socio-economic development, it does not purport to
explain the history of existence in its entirety. The scope of historical materialism is therefore
necessarily restricted to human societies and their material conditions.
In summary, when historical materialism is treated as an all-encompassing and final
explanation of reality, it risks overextension beyond its legitimate domain. If elevated to the
status of an ultimate and eternal truth, it assumes a dogmatic character by claiming explanatory
authority over questions for which no definitive empirical or philosophical evidence currently
exists. Consequently, historical materialism must be applied with methodological caution and
evaluated according to the specific level of analysis at which it is employed. Its validity and
utility depend on the field of inquiry in which it functions as an explanatory framework.
Results and Conclusion
By engaging with Lyotard, I arrive at the conclusion—though I cannot determine with
certainty whether this follows Lyotard’s own position or results from a misinterpretation—that
mind as such and mind as embodied are not identical. Mind in itself is not restricted to the
human being but must be conceived as more comprehensive, since human beings are not
absolute entities and therefore lack completeness. This becomes evident when one asks in which
language a disembodied mind would think. Given that language is a conventional system of
symbols, one may assume that such symbolic limitations do not apply to mind in itself. A mind
independent of bodies would therefore have to be understood as absolute mind. The difficulty,
however, is that this hypothesized pure and eternal mind remains inaccessible to us; there is no
empirical evidence for the existence of such a primordial mind. By contrast, evolutionary
biology tends to conceive of mind as singular and individuated, existing within each body for
itself, with some accounts even likening its functioning to that of a computer. If absolute mind
is reduced to such restrictions and bound to a body or any form of hardware, then mind itself
risks becoming mindless—particularly in a Marxist context that regards Historical Materialism
as an absolute truth, a view that has at times been enforced as such by historical regimes. This
does not imply that Marxist explanations of history are incorrect; on the contrary, they are often
highly convincing. Yet they cannot be extended to explain realities beyond human beings and
their material conditions. As such, they do not provide an ultimate answer to the question of
origins, and, as shown above, materialist explanations alone remain insufficient.
If mind is universal, it must transcend language; if it is not universal, then its mode of
functioning must be clarified. What is evident is that mind does not function like a computer: it
18
is not merely a mechanical process of pattern matching. Mind is instead something irreducibly
complex. From this perspective, artificial intelligence is not even remotely comparable to the
human brain, as it lacks the capacity to analyze perceptual impulses in a reflexive manner. Its
“thoughts” are not genuine thoughts, since AI is not aware of its own discourses. This lack of
discursive self-awareness—particularly through language—demonstrates that AI is
significantly weaker than human cognitive capacities. Human beings are aware of their
discourses; they can analyze their content and make ethical decisions grounded in deeply
inherited moral convictions. AI, by contrast, is programmed to fulfill human instructions and
thus functions primarily as a people-pleaser. Moreover, AI lacks a soul and therefore possesses
neither self-awareness nor a life force. As discussed through Wong, the concept of soul or mind
may be physicalized within a Christian framework, yet this approach is no more fully satisfying
than secular alternatives. Nonetheless, Christian physicalism remains a valid paradigm and
cannot be dismissed as irrational. Similarly, Neodarwinism, as a materialist framework, has
produced substantial evidence for microevolution, but its extrapolation to macroevolution
remains problematic. To date, the fundamental question—the origin of life—remains
unresolved. Consequently, whether one aligns with idealism or materialism ultimately rests on
conviction rather than definitive proof. While I hold my own convictions, they are not relevant
to the aims of an academic paper and are therefore bracketed here.
Class consciousness and an understanding of historical processes do not preclude an
idealist position, nor do they render one a deficient socialist. Christian, Islamic, Jewish, and
Buddhist forms of socialism, to name only a few, can collaborate with classical Marxism in
efforts to transform society, as they share the diagnosis that the means of production are
concentrated in the hands of a few who exploit the working class. Likewise, the historical shift
from industrial capitalism to financial capitalism constitutes a common analytical concern. The
primary divergence lies in the grounding of awareness—which presupposes mind—and thus in
its source and legitimation within religious and non-religious frameworks. This divergence, in
turn, shapes differing understandings of the origin and function of religion. Nevertheless, the
identification of injustice remains shared. The remaining question for both perspectives
concerns whether particular churches align themselves with imperial power or with the common
people, and what concrete contributions they make to the lives of those people.
A central problem of contemporary political and intellectual life appears to be a growing
radicalization, characterized by the tendency to delegitimize opposing positions rather than to
engage with viewpoints fundamentally different from one’s own. This dynamic fosters the
ideologization of societies, disproportionately strengthening extreme positions and
undermining pluralism. Such tendencies are observable across political systems, regardless of
whether a state situates itself within the tradition of Western liberal democracy, socialist
governance, or non-democratic structures. Even the concept of democratic centralism, as
formulated by Lenin, contains a democratic dimension insofar as it permits extensive internal
pluralism and open debate prior to decision-making, while requiring unity in action once a
decision has been reached. A comparable principle operates within Western parliamentary
systems: legislative proposals are subject to open deliberation, yet once a vote is concluded, its
outcome is accepted as binding. However, when the range of views considered legitimate
becomes excessively restricted, political discourse narrows and democratic processes stagnate.
19
As illustrated by debates surrounding materialism, philosophical positions often exist in
multiple forms, encompassing diverse assumptions and conclusions. Avoiding intellectual
stagnation therefore requires acknowledging the coexistence of multiple paradigms rather than
rigidly adhering to a single framework. While evolutionary theory provides powerful
explanations for many natural processes, it does not fully account for the origin of life or the
existence of reality itself. In this context, idealist theories remain philosophically legitimate,
and their dismissal as “pseudoscience” constitutes a threat to scientific pluralism—much as
societal ideologization threatens democratic pluralism. In periods of heightened ideological
polarization, science itself becomes vulnerable to instrumentalization by opposing forces,
including both militant atheism and religious fundamentalism, each seeking to impose
restrictive agendas that compromise scientific freedom. The long-standing philosophical debate
over the primacy of matter or mind, spanning more than two millennia, has increasingly been
appropriated by political agendas and cultural conflicts. In light of this development, Marxists
and socialists, notwithstanding their internal differences, should seek solidarity in defense of
intellectual openness, scientific pluralism, and a free society.
20
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